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Abstract
In this note1, we revisit EZBFT[2] and present safety, liveness and execution consistency violations in
the protocol. To demonstrate these violations, we present simple scenarios, involving only four replicas,
two clients, and one or two owner changes. We also note shortcomings of the presented TLA+ specification
used to model check the proposed protocol.
1 Introduction
EZBFT[2] presents a leaderless and speculative byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol that
requires an optimal 3f +1 replicas to tolerate at most f malicious replicas. To be leaderless, EZBFT adopts
protocol design specification from Egalitarian Paxos (EPaxos) [8] and assigns a two-dimensional instance
space with each replica proposing in their own instance space. Replicas execute the consensus protocol to
reach agreement on a proposed command (say, α) and its ordering attributes – non-commutative commands
with respect to the proposed command α.
Replicas speculatively (and optimistically) execute a proposed command with respect to ordering at-
tributes before reaching agreement, and reply directly to the client as in Zyzzyva[5]. The clients can also be
byzantine faulty. EZBFT completes in two communication steps when all 3f +1 replicas respond identically
and there are no failures. The protocol requires additional two communication steps when some replicas fail
or the ordering attributes for the proposed command aren’t final. In such situations, the client finalizes the
ordering attributes and commits the finalized command in two communication steps. This corresponds to a
possibly byzantine faulty client committing a command in two communication steps. However, a two-step
consensus protocol requires at least 5f + 1 replicas [7]. As a result, EZBFT violates safety property of a
consensus protocol. EZBFT also violates liveness and execution consistency; a requirement for total ordering
of non-commutative commands.
In this note, we present three simple execution scenarios that exhibit safety, execution consistency, and
liveness violations. To demonstrate the scenarios, we require a simple setup with only 4 replicas tolerating
f = 1 byzantine failures, two clients, one of which is byzantine faulty, and one owner change during protocol
execution. Owner change is a process that elects a new leader to replace a faulty leader. Although, EZBFT
has been formally verified in TLA+[6], the presented specification doesn’t fully specify the proposed protocol.
We discuss shortcomings of the specification in Section 5.
Shrestha et al.[9] have shown a similar safety violation in hBFT[4], a consensus protocol that promises
two-step executions with only 3f + 1 replicas.
We have communicated with the authors of the EZBFT paper regarding the protocol violations. They
have notified us that they are working on an extended version of the protocol to address the presented issues.
1This note pertains to the work presented in [2]. The authors of [2] are working on an extended version of the protocol to
address the concerns identified in the note.
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2 Preliminaries
EZBFT requires a total of N = 3f+1 replicas with each replica given a unique id ∈ {1...3f+1}. The protocol
considers a standard communication channel that is authenticated, reliable and asynchronous; messages sent
between replicas may take a long time before being delivered, but are never lost. Replicas exchange messages
on the communication channel to reach consensus on a common value. The entire state space for each replica
is represented as a two-dimensional instance space. Each replica R is assigned its own instance space that
consists of unbounded sequence of numbered instances such as R.0, R.1, R.3,... where only replica R is
allowed to propose. At most one command may be chosen at any instance.
EZBFT deals with partial ordering of proposed commands. In partially ordered commands, non-commutative
commands are totally ordered while commutative commands can be in any order. Non-commutative com-
mands are called interfering commands. To ensure total ordering of interfering commands, the protocol
attempts to reach agreement on not only the proposed command, but also its ordering attributes. The
ordering attributes include a list of interfering commands (also called command dependencies) and a se-
quence number. The ordering attributes are used to totally order interfering commands before execution.
We represent the command and its ordering attributes as 〈α, depsα, seqα〉 where α represents the proposed
command, depsα represents the set of interfering commands that have been proposed and seqα represents
the sequence number assigned to the command α. The sequence number n is computed to be one higher
than the maximum of sequence numbers of the interfering commands.
A consensus protocol needs to satisfy following safety and liveness requirements:
• Agreement. All correct replicas commit a common command and its ordering attributes for the same
instance. This property is also called safety.
• Validity. A committed command must have been proposed by a client.
• Execution Consistency. If two interfering commands γ and α are committed, they will be executed
in the same order by all correct replicas.
• Liveness. A value proposed by a correct client must eventually be committed given the communication
channel is eventually partially synchronous.
Owner Number
EZBFT executes through a series of owner numbers. The protocol moves to a higher owner number when
the protocol fails to make progress at current owner number. A correct replica participates in a single owner
number at a time moving from a lower numbered owner number to a higher numbered owner number only.
The default owner number for each instance is the replica id of instance owner. A new instance leader is
elected when the owner number increments. The owner number uniquely identifies the current leader of the
instance and is computed as O mod N, where O is the owner number.
3 Skeletal Overview of EZBFT
EZBFT revolves around proposing a command, collecting its interfering commands, computing its ordering
attributes and committing the command and its ordering attributes. In EZBFT, a command may get
committed in two ways:
• Fast path in which a proposed command and its ordering attributes are committed in two communica-
tion steps when the proposed command and its ordering attributes are final and there are no byzantine
failures with all 3f + 1 replicas responding in a timely manner.
• Slow path that requires two additional communication steps in which either the proposed ordering
attributes aren’t final or less than 3f + 1 replicas respond in a timely manner.
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The Fast Path Protocol
The fast path protocol is initiated when a client c sends a command α to a replica L. Replica L becomes
leader for the client command α and assigns next available instance L.i in its instance space. Replica L
enlists the commands that interferes with command α in its entire local instance space. The interfering
commands aren’t necessarily committed. Replica L also computes a sequence number that is one higher
than the maximum of sequence numbers assigned to the interfering commands. Assume, the command and
its ordering attributes be 〈α, depsα, seqα〉.
Replica L sends SPEC-ORDER messages to all replicas to propose tuple 〈α, depsα, seqα〉 at instance
L.i. A replica (say, R) accepts the SPEC-ORDER message if no command has been proposed at instance
L.i. Replica R updates command dependencies if it has seen any new interfering commands not included in
depsα, and updates seqα accordingly. Replica R speculatively executes command α before the command and
its ordering attributes get committed. Command α is executed based on its ordering attributes. See Section
IV.E in [2] for more details on the ordering algorithm. Replica R sends speculative response SPEC-REPLY
to the client c.
Client c waits for responses from replicas for a certain time duration. If all 3f + 1 replicas sends SPEC-
REPLY responses for the same tuple 〈α, depsα, seqα〉 in a timely manner, client c considers the command
α to be complete. It also sends COMMIT-FAST messages to all replicas to signal the completion of the
command α. The COMMIT-FAST message is accompanied by a commit certificate that consists of identical
3f + 1 SPEC-REPLY responses. Replicas also commit command α when they receive COMMIT-FAST
message with a valid commit certificate.
The Slow Path Protocol
The slow path protocol is triggered when client c times out before receiving all 3f+1 SPEC-REPLY responses
with at least 2f + 1 SPEC-REPLY response or when at least one SPEC-REPLY response contains a tuple
with updated ordering attributes. In this case, the client computes the union of all command dependencies
to find new depsα, and updates seqα accordingly. The finalized tuple 〈α, depsα, seqα〉 is sent to all replicas
in a COMMIT message. The COMMIT message is accompanied by a commit certificate that consists of
2f + 1 SPEC-REPLY responses that vouch for the updated ordering attributes.
A replica accepts the finalized command and its ordering attributes in the COMMIT message if the
commit certificate vouches for the updated command and its attributes. If the ordering attributes have
changed since the last time the replica executed the command α, the replica re-executes the command based
on new ordering attributes and responds to the client with updated results in a COMMIT-REPLY message.
The client waits for 2f + 1 identical COMMIT-REPLY messages to consider the command α complete.
Here, the client doesn’t send any signals to notify the replicas that command α has been completed.
The Owner Change Protocol
EZBFT initiates with a default owner number. The protocol transitions to a new owner number with a new
instance leader when the protocol fails to make progress at current owner number. To make the transition, the
owner change protocol is executed that selects a safe tuple to propose in a higher owner number. The owner
change protocol collects N − f OWNER-CHANGE messages which includes the SPEC-REPLY responses
sent by the replicas in previous owner number along with any commit certificates a replica has seen.
We present the rule for the owner change protocol in EZBFT to select a safe tuple. A tuple Pi is considered
safe in one of the following conditions:
Condition 1: Pi has a COMMIT message with the highest owner number to prove its entries (command
and its ordering attributes).
Condition 2: Pi has at least f + 1 SPEC-REPLY messages with the highest owner number to prove its
entries.
If there exists a tuple Pj that extends a Pi satisfying any of the above conditions, then Pj is a valid
extension of Pi if one of the following conditions hold:
3
1) Pj satisfies Condition 1, and for every command γ ∈ Pj \Pi, γ has at least f +1 SPEC-REPLY messages
with the same highest order number as Pi.
2) Pj satisfies Condition 2, and for every command γ ∈ Pj \ Pi, γ has a COMMIT message with the same
highest order number as Pi.
The new leader selects a safe tuple based on the above rule and sends the tuple to all replicas in a
NEW-OWNER message at a higher owner number. The NEW-OWNER message is accompanied by N − f
OWNER-CHANGE messages collected during the owner change protocol. Replicas accept the presented
safe tuple if it is vouched by a set of N − f OWNER-CHANGE messages in the NEW-OWNER message.
Replicas consider the accepted tuple committed.
4 Protocol Violations
Consider four replicas R, L, Q and T among which replica T is byzantine. Also, consider two clients c1 and
c2, of which client c1 is faulty.
4.1 Breaking Safety
In this scenario, we show safety violation in EZBFT with the faulty client c1.
Client c1 proposing command α and client c2 proposing command β. Commands α and β are
interfering in nature.
1. Client c1 sends command α to replica R. Replica R computes ordering attributes for α. Assume
replica R has not seen any commands that interfere with α. Hence, replica R computes the tuple to
be 〈α, {}, 1〉 and assigns an instance R.0.
2. Around the same time, client c2 sends command β to replica T which is byzantine. Replica T computes
tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 for command β and assigns an instance T.0.
3. Replica R sends SPEC-ORDER to propose 〈α, {}, 1〉 to all replicas at instance R.0.
4. Assume replicas L and Q have not seen any commands that interfere with α; hence, they do not
update the proposed tuple. Both replicas speculatively execute 〈α, {}, 1〉 and send SPEC-REPLY to
client c1 for tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
5. Replica R also speculatively executes 〈α, {}, 1〉 and responds to client c1 with SPEC-REPLY for tuple
〈α, {}, 1〉.
6. Replica T , which is byzantine, has seen command β that interferes with α. Replica T , being byzantine,
computes two tuples 〈α, {}, 1〉 and 〈α, {β}, 2〉 and hence sends two SPEC-REPLY responses to the
client c1
7. Client c1 receives responses from all four replicas in a timely manner. Client c1, being faulty, forms
two commit certificates.
i. Commit certificate – CC-Fast, consists of 3f + 1 (i.e., 4) identical SPEC-REPLY responses for
〈α, {}, 1〉. CC-Fast vouches for tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
ii. Commit certificate – CC-Slow, comprises f + 1 SPEC-REPLY responses for 〈α, {}, 1〉 and f
SPEC-REPLY responses for 〈α, {β}, 2〉 (from byzantine replica T ). CC-Slow vouches for tuple
〈α, {β}, 2〉.
8. Client c1 sends CC-Fast to replica R and CC-Slow to replica Q.
9. Replica R receives CC-Fast that consists of all 3f + 1 identical SPEC-REPLY responses. As per
EZBFT protocol, replica R considers tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 final for instance R.0 and commits it.
Here, Replica R commits on the tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
10. Replica Q receives CC-Slow that vouches for 〈α, {β}, 2〉. Replica Q re-executes the finalized tuple
〈α, {β}, 2〉 and sends COMMIT-REPLY for the finalized tuple to client c1.
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At this stage, all further messages are delayed and owner change protocol is triggered. During owner change
protocol, replicas send their SPEC-REPLY responses along with any commit certificates they have. Assume
the next owner for instance R.0 is replica L.
1. Replica L collects 2f +1 OWNER-CHANGE messages, all of which are at the highest owner number.
– Replica L sends its accepted tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
– Replica Q sends its finalized tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉 along with the commit certificate, CC-Slow, for tuple
〈α, {β}, 2〉.
– Replica T , which is byzantine, sends tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉.
Response from replica R gets delayed.
2. As per the protocol specification during owner change (Condition 1), replica L selects tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉
as a safe tuple as it is vouched by a commit certificate, CC-Slow.
3. Replica L proposes tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉 at instance R.0 along with a proof that includes commit certificate,
CC-Slow in NEW-OWNER message.
4. Replicas L, Q and T receive NEW-OWNER messages that proposes tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉 with a valid
commit certificate, CC-Slow. Because of a valid proof, they accept tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉. Replica L re-
executes the finalized tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉 and responds to the client c1.
Here, Replicas L and Q commit on the tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉.
4.2 Breaking Execution Consistency
In this scenario, we show violation of execution consistency in EZBFT. To show the violation, we do not
require any byzantine behavior from replicas and clients.
Client c1 proposing command α and client c2 proposing command β. Commands α and β are
interfering in nature.
1. Client c1 sends command α to replica R. Replica R computes ordering attributes for α. Assume
replica R has not seen any commands that interfere with α. Hence, replica R computes the tuple to
be 〈α, {}, 1〉 and assigns an instance R.0.
2. Similarly, client c2 sends command β to replica Q. Replica Q computes ordering attributes for β.
Assume replica Q has not seen any commands that interfere with β. Hence, replica Q computes the
tuple to be 〈β, {}, 1〉 and assigns an instance Q.0.
3. Replica R sends SPEC-ORDER to all replicas to propose 〈α, {}, 1〉 at instance R.0. Replica R also
speculatively executes 〈α, {}, 1〉 and sends SPEC-REPLY to client c1.
4. Similarly, replica Q sends SPEC-ORDER to all replicas to propose 〈β, {}, 1〉 at instance Q.0. Replica
Q also speculatively executes 〈β, {}, 1〉 and responds to client c2 with a SPEC-REPLY for 〈β, {}, 1〉.
5. Assume replica L has not seen any commands that interfere with α; hence, it does not update any
proposed tuple. Replica L speculatively executes the tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 and responds client c1 with
SPEC-REPLY for 〈α, {}, 1〉.
6. Replica Q receives the proposed tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 at instance R.0. Replica Q has seen command β
that interfere with command α at instance Q.0. It finalizes the tuple to be 〈α, {β}, 2〉. Replica
Q speculatively executes the finalized tuple and responds to client c1 with SPEC-REPLY for tuple
〈α, {β}, 2〉.
7. Assume replica T has not seen any commands that interferes with β. hence, it does not update any
the proposed tuple. Replica T speculatively executes the tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 and responds to client c2 with
SPEC-REPLY for 〈β, {}, 1〉.
8. Replica R receives the proposed tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 at instance Q.0. Replica R has seen command α that
interferes with command β at instance R.0. It finalizes the tuple to be 〈β, {α}, 2〉. Replica R specu-
latively executes the finalized tuple and responds client c2 with SPEC-REPLY for tuple 〈β, {α}, 2〉.
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At this stage, all further messages are delayed and owner change protocol is triggered for both instances
R.0 and Q.0. Assume the next owner for instance R.0 is replica L and the next owner for instance Q.0 is
replica T .
Recovery for instance R.0
1. Replica L collects 2f +1 OWNER-CHANGE messages, all of which are at the highest owner number.
– Replica L (itself) sends its accepted tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
– Replica R sends its accepted tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
– Replica Q sends its accepted tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉.
Here, there are no any commit certificates.
2. As per protocol specification during owner change (Condition 2), replica L selects tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 as
a safe tuple as there exist f + 1 SPEC-REPLY messages. Although, tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉 extends tuple
〈α, {}, 1〉, there exists no COMMIT message for command β. Hence, EZBFT computes 〈α, {}, 1〉 to be
the safe tuple.
3. New instance leader L proposes tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 at instance R.0 along with a proof that shows the
proposed tuple is safe in NEW-OWNER message.
4. Replicas L, Q and T accept the proposed tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 accompanied by a valid proof, speculatively
execute the finalized tuple and commit on it.
Here, tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 is committed at instance R.0.
Recovery for instance Q.0
1. Replica T collects 2f + 1 owner change messages, all of which are at the highest owner number.
– Replica T (itself) sends its accepted tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉.
– Replica Q sends its accepted tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 for instance Q.0.
– Replica R sends its accepted tuple 〈β, {α}, 2〉.
2. With similar explanation as above, replica T computes tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 as safe tuple.
3. New instance leader T proposes tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 at instance Q.0 in NEW-OWNER message.
4. Replicas R, Q and T accept the proposed tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 accompanied by a valid proof, speculatively
execute the finalized tuple and commit on it.
Here, tuple 〈β, {}, 1〉 is committed at instance Q.0.
Here, interfering commands α and β get committed without being in either command’s dependency list.
Hence, interfering commands α and β may be executed in any order violating execution consistency.
4.3 Breaking Liveness
In this scenario, we show liveness violation. To show the violation, we require a single faulty client c1.
Client c1 proposing command α.
1. Client c1 sends command α to replica R. Replica R computes ordering attributes for α. Replica R
computes the tuple to be 〈α, {}, 1〉 and assigns an instance R.0.
2. Replica R sends SPEC-ORDER to all replicas to propose 〈α, {}, 1〉 at instance R.0. Replica R also
speculatively executes 〈α, {}, 1〉 and responds to client c1 with SPEC-REPLY for tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
3. Assume replica L and Q have not seen any commands that interfere with α; hence, they do not update
the proposed tuple. Both replicas speculatively execute 〈α, {}, 1〉 and send SPEC-REPLY to client c1
for tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
4. Assume replica T has seen a command β (from some client c2) that interfere with command α. Replica
T updates the tuple to be 〈α, {β}, 2〉, speculatively executes it and sends SPEC-REPLY message to
client c1 for 〈α, {β}, 2〉.
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5. Client c1, which is faulty, forms two commit certificates each with 2f + 1 SPEC-REPLY messages.
i. A commit certificate CC1 that contains 2f+1 identical SPEC-REPLY messages for tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
i. A commit certificate CC2 that contains f + 1 SPEC-REPLY messages for tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 and f
SPEC-REPLY messages for 〈α, {β}, 2〉. CC2 vouches for 〈α, {β}, 2〉.
6. Client c1 sends commit certificate CC1 to replica R and commit certificate CC2 to replica L.
At this stage, all further messages are delayed and owner change protocol is triggered for instance R.0.
Assume the next owner for instance R.0 is replica L.
1. Replica L collects 2f + 1 owner change messages, all of which are at the highest owner number.
– Replica R sends its accepted tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉 along with CC1 that vouches for tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
– Replica L sends its accepted tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉 along with CC2 that vouches for tuple 〈α, {β}, 2〉.
– Replica Q sends its accepted tuple 〈α, {}, 1〉.
At this stage, there exist two commit certificates, CC1 and CC2, that vouch for different tuples. Both the
tuples are at the highest owner number. The owner change protocol in EZBFT doesn’t specify any rules to
handle such scenarios. Hence, the protocol gets stuck violating the liveness property.
5 TLA+ Formal Verification
EZBFT provides TLA+ [6] specification of the protocol in the technical report [3] and has been model checked
using TLC model checker[1] to verify the correctness of the protocol. However, the specification appears to
have following limitations.
• EZBFT doesn’t fully specify how byzantine replicas can behave. In the specification, the byzantine
behavior of faulty replicas is restricted to simply replying with empty dependencies and a sequence
number of 1. The byzantine leaders also do not propose inconsistent commands which corresponds
to actions similar to correct leaders. In reality, byzantine leaders can propose inconsistent commands
resulting in inconsistent command dependencies and byzantine replicas may append partial or no
dependencies at all.
• The paper mentions the protocol can handle unlimited number of faulty clients. However, the TLA+
specification doesn’t specify any faulty client behavior. The clients always behave correctly in the
specification. A faulty client may form different commit certificates and send different certificates to
different replicas. The scenarios presented above use such faulty client behavior to show safety and
liveness violations.
• The specification doesn’t check the condition that if two interfering commands α and γ are committed,
then either α has γ in α’s dependency list or γ has α in γ’s dependency list or both will have each
other in their dependency list. This condition is required to ensure execution consistency property.
The scenario presented in Section 4.2 shows execution consistency violation without any byzantine
behavior.
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